Which is the meaning of constitutional review for a proper assessment of subnational constitutionalism? The essay tries to answer this question by means of comparative analysis. To do so, it considers both federal systems (the United States and Germany) and regional or autonomic systems (Italy and Spain). The analysis of organs and procedures allows to draw some conclusions: the presence of a system of constitutional review at the subnational level is a crucial element for the development of an autonomous, well-grown subnational constitutional law. However, subnational constitutional courts tend to have a more complicated relation with legislative and executive bodies, as less guarantees of independence or court-overturning amendments show. Finally, subnational constitutional courts tend to develop a quite interesting case law, whose experimental features sometimes anticipate major judicial trends
Introductory Remarks
This contribution tries to analyse the role of constitutional review and constitutional enforcement within subnational legal orders and their significance to the meaning of subnational constitutionalism. In doing so, it will try to look into organs and proceduresand, more broadly, systems of constitutional review -in a comparative perspective I .
Why should a comparative analysis of subnational constitutionalism (or subconstitutionalism, as it has also been defined II ) focus on the role of constitutional courts and constitutional review in subnational systems? There are, in my opinion, at least two good reasons for choosing such a topic.
First, the rise of constitutional review -thus meaning enforcement of constitutional provisions by the ordinary judiciary or a specialised constitutional court -has been a fundamental step in the process of legalisation of the Leviathan III :
'This issue of enforcement came to prominence early on in the establishment of modern constitutions. In the older meaning of the term, "fundamental law" was understood to be a special type of law that bound "morally and politically, not legally" … The concept of fundamental law in modern constitutional regimes is associated with the emergence of the institution of judicial review' IV .
A fundamental consequence of such development was the positivisation, depoliticisation and legalisation of constitutional documents, and 'the erosion of belief in the idea of the Constitution as a type of fundamental law (droit politique) different in kind to that of the ordinary law' V . Furthermore, those events also affected the self-understanding of constitutional law scholarship as a distinct branch of legal scholarship VI . To sum up, we have to look into the noun: is subnational constitutionalism able to shape, even thanks to the operation of constitutional review, some kind of subnational constitutional law?
Second, we have to consider the adjective: which kind of constitutional review is performed at the subnational level of federal or regional polities? According to methodological tools drawn from public choice theory, constitutions might be analysed as devices to control -and hopefully reduce -agency costs. In their survey of the defining Ginsburg and Posner's assumptions mainly concern government, fundamental rights, and procedures of constitutional revision. Are they true of constitutional review as well?
These are the two main research questions which this paper will address in order to sketch a profile of subnational constitutional review. The analysis and possible answers will be organised around: (1) the existence of a relation between subnational constitutionalism and constitutional review; (2) the significance of Ginsburg and Posner's lower-stakes hypothesis to the subject of this paper; and (3) some interesting features of subnational constitutional case law.
Choosing the Cases: Systems of Constitutional Review and Comparative Analysis
When it comes to pointing out the relevant cases in this area, a preliminary distinction has to be drawn. There is a deep link between federal constitutional arrangements and the rise of constitutional review. On the one hand, German and Austro-Hungarian The analysis will be organised as follows. It will consider: (1) enforcement of subnational constitutional law in a diffuse system of constitutional review (the US); (2) some marking aspects of a complete system of subnational constitutional courts (Germany); and (3) the problem of constitutional review in 'autonomic' legal systems where the central state holds a monopoly over it (Italy and Spain). In the end I will try to answer the two research questions that I pointed out at the beginning of this paper.
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Constitutional Review in the German Länder
As mentioned before, the German judiciary is traditionally characterised by the presence of a number of specialised branches, among which is a court specifically entrusted with constitutional review (Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit). Accordingly, fifteen out of sixteen Länder in Germany decided to establish a constitutional court of their own. Thus even if the practical operation of the Spanish federalising process has gone well beyond a mere autonomic frame, the traditional scholarly distinction between federal systems and autonomous (or regional) ones is still relevant to the self-understanding of the system.
For the purposes of this paper, in particular, it is clear that: (1) Because, among other reasons, of the procedural difficulty of reviewing legislation under the provisions entrenched in the regional Statuti, however, the Italian Constitutional Court has quite rarely used those provisions to review the legitimacy of (regional) ordinary legislation LXVI .
Furthermore, another major concern is how to build up a 'culture' of legislation and Those organs share some features with both the legislative and the judiciary LXX . In Italy their functions mainly concern the methods of regional legislation and its compliance with procedural standards laid down in the regional charters. This appears to be very interesting in an age marked by the perception of an irresistible decline of representative legislatures and the legislative function LXXI . They embody a sort of 'public' consultative function which faces a radical change in legislation: 'legislative activity has radically changed in the last few decades: it has become extraordinarily more complex than has happened before, much more limited and constrained' LXXII . Besides this, however, those consultative bodies should also play a role of protection of minorities and, most interestingly, of local government authorities, which have generally no standing before national constitutional courts.
Furthermore, they are supposed to act in an institutional framework characterised -as it happens in Italy -by the presence of a strong executive and a legislature which is always dominated, thanks to the peculiar features of election systems, by the regional president's coalition LXXIII . This is why structural aspects of consultative bodies are carefully laid down, so as to allow political minorities to have a say in the designation of their components. 
A Possible Conclusion
In my opinion, the comparative analysis that I have tried to sketch in this paper does lend itself to some conclusions which do not necessarily fit into a harmonious and coherent picture. Still, they might provide a faithful representation of the 'spirit' of subnational constitutionalism in the legal systems which I have considered.
First, there is a persuasive link between lively subnational constitutional arrangements and the existence of some form of constitutional review at the subnational level. These are all important demonstrations of how the subnational constitutional space may act as a laboratory not only with regard to higher levels of protection of fundamental rights but also to a more transparent and participative political process. 
